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Regulatory infringements are extremely common in low-income countries,
especially with respect to retail pharmaceutical sales. There have been few
practical suggestions on public policy responses other than stricter regulatory
enforcement, which governments are often unable, or unwilling, to do. This
paper explores the challenges of regulating retail drug sellers, and potential
solutions, through a case study of malaria treatment in rural Tanzania where
small drug shops are a common source of medicine.
Infringement of health-related regulation was extremely common. Most stores
lacked valid permits, and illegal stocking of prescription-only medicines and
unpackaged tablets was the norm. Most stocked unregistered drugs, and no
serving staff met the qualification requirements. Infringements are likely to have
reflected infrequent regulatory inspections, a failure of regulatory authorities to
implement sanctions, successful concealment of regulatory violations, and the
tacit permission of local regulatory staff.
Eliminating regulatory infringements is unlikely to be feasible, and could be
undesirable if access to essential medicines is reduced. Alternatives include
bringing official drug regulation closer into line with locally legitimate practices;
greater use of positive incentives for providers; and consumer involvement.
Such a change in approach has the potential to provide a firmer platform for
public-private collaboration to improve shop-based treatment.
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Introduction
Regulation of the private health care sector in low-income
countries is argued to be highly ineffective, with common
practices including the use of under-qualified staff, illegal
provision of certain drugs and services, and a failure to meet
quality standards and obtain official registration (Bennett et al.
1994; Kumaranayake 1998; Hongoro and Kumaranayake 2000).
Particular concern has been expressed about regulation of
drug retailers, where regulatory enforcement is reported to be
especially inadequate (Kumaranayake 1997; Tawfik et al. 2002).
However, the retail sector is very widely used, accounting for a
high proportion of care for common health problems such
as malaria, acute respiratory infections, sexually transmitted
infections and tuberculosis (Uplekar et al. 1998; Brugha and
Zwi 1999; Berman 2000; McCombie 2002). In a review of
studies of the treatment of childhood febrile illness in Africa,
the median percentage using the retail sector was roughly 50%,
with rates as high as 70 or 80% in some settings (Brieger et al.
2004). Care-seekers reportedly choose the retail sector over
health facilities because retailers are more accessible, provide
quicker service, have more reliable drug stocks, are courteous
and approachable, and in some cases are less costly (Williams
and Jones 2004). Moreover, there has been growing interest
in the potential to use retail providers to expand coverage of
appropriate care for key health problems (Smith et al. 2001;
Tawfik et al. 2002; Brieger et al. 2004).
Pharmaceutical retailers in sub-Saharan Africa include a
very limited number of formal pharmacies, and numerous
general stores that sell a range of groceries and household
products. Medicines are also sold by small drug shops in many
areas of East and West Africa, including Tanzania, Uganda,
Eritrea, Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroon (Van der Geest 1987;
Oshiname and Brieger 1992; Adome et al. 1996; Murray et al.
1998; Nsimba et al. 1999; Dzator and Asafu Adjaye 2004;
Goodman et al. 2004). Drug shops generally stock a range of
medicines for common ailments, basic first aid supplies and
toiletries. They have been argued to provide a suitable entry
point for government intervention to improve retail sector
treatment, as they form an established network in both urban
and rural areas, and their staff generally have some medical
training or experience (Goodman et al. 2004).
However, there is widespread concern that drug shops
frequently flout pharmaceutical regulations and prioritize
profit-making over good quality treatment, leading to poor
quality care, unsafe practices and behaviour that encourages
the development of antimicrobial drug resistance. In many
countries, calls for a more active role for retailers have met with
resistance from at least some government health personnel,
who favour stricter law enforcement or an outright ban of such
commercial drug sales (Reynolds Whyte and Birungi 2000;
Brieger 2002). In other settings, drug stores are tolerated,
but their frequent abuses of regulations may compromise the
willingness of government agencies to engage in formal
collaboration.
In this paper we explore challenges involved in drug
store regulation through a case study of malaria treatment in
rural Tanzania. Rates of infringement of key health-related
regulations are evaluated. A combination of quantitative and
qualitative data is used to develop an in-depth understanding
of the reasons for these infringements and their likely impact
on public health outcomes. Finally, potential policy responses
are proposed for improving retail regulation and public-private
collaboration in low-income settings.
Background: pharmaceutical
regulation in Tanzania
At the time of data collection in 2001, pharmaceutical
regulation in Tanzania was the responsibility of the Pharmacy
Board, through the 1978 Pharmaceuticals and Poisons Act and
the 1990 Pharmaceuticals and Poisons Regulations. In 2003
these responsibilities were taken over by the Tanzania Food
and Drugs Authority (TFDA), with the passing of the Food,
Drugs and Cosmetics Act. However, in practice the implemen-
tation of drug retailer regulation has remained broadly
unchanged.
There are two types of drug-specific retailer in Tanzania:
Part I and Part II pharmacies. A limited range of medicines
is also available in some general stores. Part I pharmacies have
to be run by a registered pharmacist, and are allowed to sell
both prescription-only and over-the-counter (OTC) medicines.
In 2003 there were 344 Part I pharmacies in Tanzania, 60% of
which were in the commercial capital, Dar es Salaam, with the
rest distributed unevenly throughout the regions, always in
urban areas (Battersby et al. 2003).
Drugs are much more widely available from Part II pharma-
cies, known as maduka ya dawa baridi or drug shops. Drug shops
were established in the 1970s to address the lack of access to
medicines for much of the rural and peri-urban population.
In 2003 the Pharmacy Board had records of 5666 drug shops,
KEY MESSAGES
 Infringement of regulations related to drugs stocked, staffing and permits are extremely common in retail drug stores in
Tanzania.
 Regulatory infringements are likely to reflect a combination of infrequent regulatory inspections, a failure of regulatory
authorities to implement sanctions, successful concealment of regulatory violations, and the tacit permission of local
regulatory staff.
 Eliminating regulatory infringements is unlikely to be feasible, and could be undesirable if access to essential medicines
is reduced; alternatives include bringing official drug regulation closer into line with locally legitimate practices,
greater use of positive incentives for providers, and consumer involvement.
394 HEALTH POLICY AND PLANNING
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/heapol/article-abstract/22/6/393/702667
by guest
on 07 February 2018
although the total number may be considerably higher
(Battersby et al. 2003). They are required to obtain a
Pharmacy Board (now TFDA) permit each year, and to meet
certain conditions related to the premises, qualifications of the
seller and products stocked (Ministry of Health 1998). Drug
store owners do not need any specific qualifications, but all
staff serving customers are required to have basic medical
knowledge, which is interpreted by regulatory staff to mean a
minimum of 4 years training (e.g. pharmacy assistant or
nurse). They are allowed to stock basic medical supplies and
OTC medicines only, known as baridi drugs. Baridi literally
means cool or cold, or could be translated as weak or mild.
Medicines are classified as baridi because they are relatively
safe, used for minor and self-limiting conditions, and their use
is believed to be well understood by the public. Drug shops are
not permitted to sell any prescription-only drugs, including all
non-topical antibiotics and injectables of any kind.
In terms of antimalarials, the regulations were amended
following the change in national antimalarial drug policy in
August 2001, when high levels of resistance led chloroquine to
be abandoned as first-line treatment in favour of sulphadoxine
pyrimethamine (SP). SP remained the first-line drug until 2006,
when it was in turn replaced by artemether-lumefantrine.
Before the 2001 policy change, drug stores were permitted
to stock oral formulations of chloroquine and amodiaquine, the
first- and second-line drugs. Between 2001 and 2006, amodia-
quine remained the second-line drug, and was still permitted,
but chloroquine was withdrawn. There was some confusion
over the regulatory position of the new first-line, SP, as many
expected it to be given OTC status, but in fact it remained
prescription-only. All injectable antimalarials and all formula-
tions of other antimalarials such as quinine and artesunate
have always been designated as prescription-only.
All drugs on sale should be registered in Tanzania, although
locally manufactured drugs have been exempted from registra-
tion for a given period while domestic manufacturing standards
are improved. All medicines sold in drug shops are required to
be sold in unit packs, i.e. packaged as single doses accompanied
by the manufacturer’s instructions for use. From a public
health perspective, packaged tablets are preferable to those sold
loose for several reasons. The consumer is more likely to take
away information on the name and dosing of the drugs;
tablets are less likely to be damaged or subject to degradation;
and shopkeepers are less likely to decant tablets into other
containers.
Drug shop inspection has two components. Firstly, drug shops
should be inspected on a quarterly basis by a drug regulatory
inspector. Regional Pharmacists and Regional Medical Officers
are designated as inspectors, and collaborate with District
Medical Officers and District Pharmacists in implementation.
The inspectors’ remit includes looking for prohibited products,
and checking drug expiry dates, the permit and the competence
of the seller. In addition, all retailers, including drug stores,
should be inspected regularly by an environmental health
officer, generally a health assistant based at the local health
centre, known locally as Bwana Afya (literally ‘Mr Health’).
Their remit is to approve the outlet premises and inspect the
safety and appropriate storage of products, including expiry
dates on drugs and foodstuffs.
Methods
Study site
The study took place in the rural districts of Kilombero, Ulanga
and Rufiji in southeastern Tanzania, where the main economic
activity is subsistence farming, and median monthly per capita
expenditure is under US$10 (Household Budget Survey 2002).
Data were collected in the areas of each district covered by
a demographic surveillance system (DSS) which undertakes
continuous monitoring of births, deaths and migrations.
The areas contained populations of 73 839 in Rufiji and 66 503
in Kilombero/Ulanga in mid-2001. Use of the DSS areas allowed
a detailed census of drug retailers to be conducted by local
DSS field staff who lived in the areas and knew them well
(government records of retailers were highly incomplete). The
DSS covered only rural areas, where the malaria burden is most
severe (Schellenberg et al. 2003). Ifakara Town is located a few
kilometres from the start of Ulanga and Kilombero DSS areas,
but providers in the town were rarely used for fever/malaria
treatment seeking (96% of visits took place within the DSS area
of residence) (Goodman 2004).
The areas suffer intense and perennial malaria transmission,
and malaria is the leading diagnosis for outpatient visits.
The symptoms of mild or uncomplicated malaria include fever,
chills, headache and nausea, and patients are generally treated
on an ambulatory basis. Prompt access to appropriate treatment
is essential because malaria can rapidly progress to severe
disease, with a high case fatality rate (Greenwood et al. 1987).
The recommended treatment consists of prompt access to
a course of antimalarials, supplemented by antipyretics to
help reduce fever and pain. The vast majority of cases are
treated presumptively, on the basis of fever alone, although
many febrile patients are not parasitaemic (Font et al. 2001;
Kachur et al. 2006).
Malaria treatment is provided through a network of public
and church-run dispensaries, health centres and hospitals.
The DSS areas contained 18 government facilities (4 health
centres and 14 dispensaries), and 9 private facilities (7 mission
dispensaries, 1 mission hospital and 1 commercial dispensary).
In 2001 there were no Part I pharmacies in the DSS areas, but
there were 32 Part II drug shops; 30 were commercially owned,
and 2 were recently opened not-for-profit village-run stores.
Drugs were also available from numerous general stores and
kiosks, which sold a wide range of household goods. However,
this analysis focuses on commercial drug stores, which were
responsible for 88% of retail sector antimalarial drug volumes
(Goodman 2004).
Drug stores typically consist of a single building, with cement
or brick walls and a tin roof. Most owners employ just one
regular seller, who usually works full-time at the shop. The
shops are generally located in the more populous areas, and
typically open from 7.30/8am to 9pm, 7 days a week. In 2001
they accounted for 31% of provider visits for reported fever/
malaria, compared with 34% for general shops, 26% for govern-
ment facilities, 7% for private facilities and 2% for traditional
healers or other providers (Goodman 2004). The high use
of drug shops was linked to their long opening hours and
friendly service, lack of consultation and laboratory fees,
perceived staff expertise, and the reliability and range of
their drug stocks, especially compared with government
DRUG SHOP REGULATION AND MALARIA TREATMENT IN TANZANIA 395
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/heapol/article-abstract/22/6/393/702667
by guest
on 07 February 2018
facilities (Goodman 2004). However, a number of problems
with the appropriateness of treatment were reported (Goodman
2004). An antimalarial was obtained at only 55% of drug
store visits for fever/malaria, and 29% of antimalarials obtained
were dispensed as under-doses. Injectable antimalarials were
purchased at 5% of drug store visits, and antibiotics at 13%,
although in many cases it was not clear that these drugs were
justified by reported symptoms.
Data sources
Data were collected from shops using three tools. In each case
we aimed to interview the person most involved with day-
to-day management, which in some cases was the owner and
in others the main seller. First, a census of all private sources
of manufactured drugs in the DSS areas was conducted in
mid-2000 and updated in mid-2001 (the ‘outlet census’), for
which methods are described in detail elsewhere (Goodman
et al. 2004). The outlet census provided basic data on the
number, location and drug stocks of outlets, and was used as
the sampling frame for the remaining data collection activities,
which were conducted between August and December 2001.
Secondly, more detailed representative data on shop character-
istics, inspection visits and compliance with regulations were
collected through a structured survey of all 30 commercial drug
stores in the DSS areas (19 in Rufiji, 9 in Kilombero and 2 in
Ulanga). Of the interviewees, 3 were drug store owners and
27 were employed as sellers; 29 served regularly in the shop
and 1 occasionally. The majority (26) were female. Thirdly,
in-depth qualitative data on providers’ perceptions and beha-
viour were gathered through semi-structured interviews with
staff at five purposively selected drug stores (three in Rufiji and
one each in Kilombero and Ulanga). These in-depth interviews
involved four female sellers and one male owner (who was
also the main seller). Although the number of qualitative inter-
views was small, the shops selected encompassed the range
of staffing, stocking patterns and general operation observed
in the study sites. These data were supplemented by key
informant interviews with three government officials respon-
sible for overseeing pharmaceutical regulation at the district,
regional and national level, respectively.
Informed consent was obtained for all interviews with shop
staff, which were conducted in KiSwahili. Qualitative inter-
views were subjected to manual content analysis, based on a
preliminary coding scheme, which was refined throughout the
process. Quantitative data were double-entered using FoxPro
2.6a, and checked for logical consistency and coding errors, and
analysis was performed using STATA 8 (Stata Inc. 2003).
Compliance with a number of health-related regulations was
assessed during the structured survey, focusing on those most
likely to affect the quality of fever/malaria treatment and the
potential for future public/private collaboration or interventions.
The assessment covered the presence of a Pharmacy Board
permit, the qualifications of selling staff, and stocking of prohi-
bited products such as prescription-only drugs, unpackaged
tablets and unregistered or expired antimalarials. We also
assessed the appropriateness of dosing instructions on tablet
packaging for the first- and second-line antimalarials, SP and
amodiaquine. Potential reasons underlying regulatory contra-
ventions were explored using data from the structured survey
and qualitative interviews. All verbatim quotes are from the
qualitative interviews.
Questions concerning regulation and illegal behaviour are
inevitably highly sensitive and there was therefore a risk that
shop staff would decline to participate or fail to provide full
and truthful answers. We addressed this issue in several ways.
First, our field team were introduced by local DSS staff, who
knew the communities well and were able to corroborate our
assurances that we were unconnected with any regulatory
body. Secondly we complemented the quantitative survey with
qualitative interviews which provided a more conducive forum
to discuss sensitive issues in depth. Finally, sensitive questions
on regulation were asked towards the end of the interviews,
once a reasonable rapport had been developed. As a result,
no drug stores refused to participate in any data collection
activities, it proved feasible to raise sensitive regulatory issues,
and many interviewees were very open in their discussion.
However, participants will still have had strong incentives
to conceal certain information, so reported rates of illegal
behaviour should be considered a minimum.
The study received ethical approval from the institutional
review boards of the Ifakara Health Research and Development
Centre, the Tanzanian Medical Research Coordinating
Committee, and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine.
Results
We first present data on the degree of compliance with
regulations, followed by an assessment of the likely causes of
the infringements observed.
Compliance with regulations
Regulatory violations were common (Table 1). Pharmacy board
permits were displayed in only 19 of the 30 drug stores. Of the
nine stores with permits in Kilombero and Ulanga, two permits
were out-of-date, and in seven shops the seller specified on the
permit was not working there (the Rufiji permits did not
display these details). An owner explained that it was easier
to get a permit renewal if you did not change the name of
the owner or seller. Only one of the 37 staff serving regularly
had no health qualifications at all. However, none had
the required minimum of 4 years health-related training. The
mean was 1.4 years, with most staff being Nurse Assistants
(a 1 year course).
Stocking of prescription-only medicines was very common.
Interviewees reported that 16 drug shops stocked prescription-
only painkillers, and all but one stocked prescription-only
antimalarials. Even excluding SP, for which the status was
unclear, 27 stocked other prescription-only antimalarials,
predominantly quinine. In addition, 24 out of 26 drug stores
interviewed during the initial outlet census stocked antibiotics.
Unregistered imported antimalarials were found in 19 drug
shops, including unregistered brands of SP tablets and syrup,
amodiaquine tablets and syrup, and quinine and artesunate
tablets. Expired antimalarials were found in four shops. Each
shop had only one expired product, representing 2% of all
antimalarials stocked. Three of the products were less than
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a month past their expiry date, but one was over a year. For a
further 3% of products no expiry date was shown.
All drugs sold in shops should be in unit packs, but the
sale of loose painkillers and antimalarials from pots was found
in 29 and 22 drug stores, respectively. Loose tablets were
generally taken away in home-made paper envelopes, labelled
with a handwritten abbreviated drug name and dose.
Even on packaged drugs, dosing instructions were inadequate
and inconsistent (Table 2). Of the 14 packaged SP tablet
products stocked, nine gave no guidance on dosing, or just
stated ‘as directed by your physician’. Of the five products with
dosing instructions, only one gave dosing information for
children consistent with national guidelines. Similarly, of the
seven packaged amodiaquine tablet products, none had dosing
information for children, three had none for adults either,
and three specified an adult dose inconsistent with national
guidelines. Finally, few people spoke fluent English in the
study sites, yet there were no instructions in KiSwahili on any
of the tablets.
Explaining infringements of pharmaceutical
regulations
Five potential causes for these frequent infringements of
health-related regulations were identified, based on previous
literature and analysis of the data collected: poor knowledge
of regulations, lack of inspections, lack of sanctions, successful
concealment of regulatory violations, and the tacit permission
of inspectors.
Knowledge of regulations
Only a minority of drug store staff had copies of the Pharmacy
Board regulations (and such copies were often outdated),
and neither drug store staff nor district-level regulators had
lists of registered medicines. There was considerable confusion
among drug shop staff about which drugs they were allowed to
stock. All sellers knew they were allowed to sell baridi drugs
only, but they were not clear which products this included.
Staff knew that common painkillers were baridi, and that
antibiotics were prohibited, but were unclear on the status of
antimalarials. As one seller said:
‘‘They’re not antibiotics, so that’s OK isn’t it?’’
Confusion over antimalarials may have been heightened by the
recent change in drug policy. This may have explained to some
degree the widespread availability of SP and to a lesser extent
oral quinine, but antibiotics were also widely stocked, although
all sellers knew they were prohibited.
Frequency of regulatory inspection
Environmental health and drug regulatory inspections were
reported to take place, although not as regularly as specified in
the regulations (Table 3). Over three-quarters of drug shops
recalled being visited by Bwana Afya. Of the 26 interviewees
who recalled the date of the visit, 8 reported a visit within the
previous 3 months, and 19 within the previous 6 months.
Interviewees in 24 shops recalled drug regulatory visits. Of
interviewees recalling the visit date, 4 reported a visit within
the previous 3 months, 15 within the previous 6 months, and
18 within the last year.
No clear patterns were detected to indicate that either type of
regulatory inspection had a constraining impact on regulatory
violations.
Imposition of sanctions
In theory a failure to comply with regulations could lead to
the drug store being fined or closed down. Interviewees at five
Table 1 Infringement of health-related regulations in drug shops
Number of drug shops infringing
regulations (n¼ 30)
Pharmacy Board permit
not displayed
11
Regular selling staff not
appropriately qualifieda
30
Stocked prescription-only
antimalarialsb
27
Stocked prescription-only
painkillers
16
Stocked unregistered imported
antimalarialsc
19
Stocked loose antimalarials 22
Stocked loose painkillers 29
Stocked expired antimalarials 4
aDefined as having less than 4 years’ medical training.
bExcluding oral chloroquine formulations because they had been removed
from the OTC list only 3–4 months before the survey, and shops were still
using up their remaining stocks during this transition period.
cExcluding all chloroquine formulations as they were not included in the new
registration system.
Table 2 Adequacy of dosing instructions on packaged antimalarial
products stocked in drug stores
SPa Amodiaquine
Number of products identified 14 7
Children under 5 years:
Any dosing guidance 4 0
Dosing guidance consistent with
national guidelines
1 n/a
Adults:
Any dosing guidance 5 4
Dosing guidance consistent with
national guidelines
4 1
aSP includes formulations of both sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine and
sulfamethoxypyridazine-pyrimethamine.
Table 3 Regulatory inspection: visits by Environmental Health and
Drug Inspectors recalled by interviewees
Ever visited (out of
29 who recalled
whether a visit
had occurred)
Visited in previous
3 months (out of
26 who recalled
whether a visit had
occurred and the date)
Environmental
Health Inspectors
22 8
Drug Regulatory
Inspectors
24 4
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of the 30 drug stores said that inspectors had reprimanded
them for stocking prescription-only drugs during their most
recent visit; in two stores such drugs had been confiscated,
and one store had been fined. At the time of the study the
maximum fine for drug stores was still set at the nominal level
of Tsh 5000 (about $5) specified in the 1978 Pharmaceuticals
and Poisons Act. During qualitative interviews, none of the
interviewees said they knew of specific examples of shops being
closed down for regulatory violations. A regulatory official
commented that court convictions were very difficult to obtain,
and could take several years. In sum, it appeared that the
penalties of being caught were low because no heavy sanctions
were implemented, and the cost of confiscation of, for example,
a few bottles of antibiotic syrup was small compared with
the profits to be made from selling relatively high-value and
popular products.
Concealing regulatory violations
Some regulatory violations may have been difficult to detect
during an inspection visit, such as verifying whether the
current seller was the person registered on the permit.
Similarly, while prescription-only products were sometimes
openly displayed, they were usually concealed from view in
a side room or in a box under the counter. However, the
availability of prescription-only drugs was well known by the
customers who regularly purchased them. In addition, all
the regulatory officials interviewed were aware of widespread
regulatory infringements, such as the use of under-qualified
sellers and stocking of prescription-only products. As one drug
store interviewee said:
‘‘I sell them (antibiotics) via the back door, and they know
that we sell via the back door. In fact you can tell someone
openly that you sell them.’’
Tacit permission
It therefore appeared that drug inspectors were at least
partially aware of regulatory violations, but still allowed them
to continue. This may have reflected the links between drug
stores and the formal health care system. Of the 30 drug stores,
nine owners and one server had jobs in the formal health
sector, the majority being health care workers at local govern-
ment facilities. Inspectors may also have been personal
acquaintances of shop staff, as in the case of this owner:
‘‘When they come I know how to deal with them . . . I know
the Regional Pharmacist, I know the District Pharmacist
well. We have eaten ugali and beans together . . .’’
Perhaps more importantly, inspectors may have given their
tacit permission, recognizing that shops met a genuine need
in communities without Part I pharmacies, in particular acting
as a reserve drug source for government facilities. As one seller
noted:
‘‘I normally have (antibiotic) syrup because it is prescribed
to many people and it is not available in the health centre.’’
A district-level regulatory official commented that, although he
was concerned about dispensing by insufficiently trained staff,
he did not mind too much about the availability of prescription-
only medicines as it served the interests of the community.
Moreover, he believed that drug stores needed to sell such
medicines in order to make a profit.
In fact, the referral of patients to drug shops by health care
staff to purchase both prescription-only and OTC medicines
when government facilities had stockouts had been semi-
formalized through the use of cheti, informal prescriptions from
government staff. These were normally written in exercise
books, and described the drug and dose required. During
qualitative interviews all drug stores reported getting many
customers with cheti for painkillers, antimalarials and anti-
biotics. In one store such patients made up around half of their
customers, and two stores linked their weekly sales patterns
to patients directed from government facilities, with sales
peaking on the days when the facility had most patients.
Finally, regulatory officials reported severe constraints in
regulatory implementation due to insufficient manpower and
transport. Inspectors may therefore have recognized that elimi-
nating such a widespread and popular practice would have
been infeasible. As one drug store owner said:
‘‘They should make changes because they forbid things
which cannot be forbidden. For instance, they say Part II
drug stores should not sell antibiotics, but the truth is that
people are selling them and they are bought a lot.’’
Discussion
Infringement of health-related regulation was extremely
common. Many drug stores lacked Pharmacy Board permits
and several others had permits which were invalid in some
way. Stocking prescription-only medicines and loose tablets was
the norm, most stocked unregistered products, and a minority
had expired antimalarials. No serving staff met the qualification
requirements.
Similar regulatory violations have been reported from other
studies of drug sellers in Tanzania and elsewhere, particularly
the illegal stocking of prescription-only medicines (van der
Geest 1987; Oshiname and Brieger 1992; Adikwu 1996; Adome
et al. 1996; Murray et al. 1998; Nsimba et al. 1999). For example,
in Dar es Salaam, 85% of undercover caretakers obtained
prescription-only drugs without a prescription from drug stores
and pharmacies (Kumaranayake et al. 2003). In Uganda, all
drug shops were found to stock prescription-only drugs (Adome
et al. 1996), and in Nigeria, only 13% of patent medicine
vendors (drug retailers) believed that the law on prescription
medicines was being obeyed (Adikwu 1996). In addition, many
studies have documented poor quality antimalarials available
on the private market (Shakoor et al. 1997; Ogwal Okeng et al.
1998; Taylor et al. 2001; Risha et al. 2002; Minzi et al. 2003;
Amin et al. 2004; Basco 2004).
On the other hand, although pharmaceutical regulation fell
short of its targets, the retail drugs market in rural Tanzania
remained relatively well ordered. For example, nearly all drug
store staff had some health-related qualifications, and the
availability of prescription-only medicines outside drug stores
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was relatively low; of general stores stocking drugs, only 1%
stocked prescription-only antimalarials, and none stocked
prescription-only painkillers (Goodman 2004). Drugs were not
available from market traders, itinerant vendors or unofficial
and unqualified ‘street doctors’, as they are in some other
locations (van der Geest 1987; Fassin 1988; Adome et al. 1996).
Moreover, household survey data indicated that the quality
of treatment obtained was no worse at drug stores than
at government facilities. For example, an antimalarial was
obtained at 55% of drug store visits for fever/malaria, compared
with 52% for government facilities, and of antimalarials
obtained, 29% were dispensed as under-doses at both drug
stores and government facilities (Goodman 2004).
However, the high rate of regulatory violations remains
a cause of concern and potential constraint on public-private
collaboration. This raises two key policy questions. Firstly,
should the government aim to clamp down by increasing the
resources allocated to enforcing existing regulations? Secondly,
are there more cost-effective approaches for improving retail
drug dispensing than the current legal tools?
Policy options
Major questions surround the feasibility of increasing regula-
tory enforcement. The evidence base on regulatory interventions
in low- and middle-income countries is very limited (Goel et al.
1996; Kumaranayake 1998; Waters et al. 2003). In Vietnam and
Lao Peoples’ Democratic Republic, interventions to improve
regulatory compliance in drug stores had a significant impact,
although a similar intervention was much less successful in
Bangkok (Stenson et al. 2001; Chalker et al. 2005). The long-
term impact of these interventions is not known, and no
comparable studies were identified in Africa, where regulatory
capacity may be particularly weak (Kumaranayake 1997).
In the study districts, regulation was the responsibility of the
District Health Management Teams, who had many other
competing demands on their resources. Moreover, even if the
government ordered more frequent regulatory visits and
harsher penalties, it is likely that some regulatory violations
would continue, as drug stores have strong financial incentives
to operate partially outside official regulations, and to make
a good living may be obliged to do so. By contrast, the
incentives for district staff to enforce regulations were likely to
be relatively weak, especially for less ‘visible’ aspects of their
work, such as the strictness of inspections and the appropriate-
ness and harshness of penalties (Meyers and Vorsanger 2002).
Even if greater enforcement were feasible, one could also
question its desirability. In some areas, improving enforcement
would be clearly beneficial, such as improving the packaging,
labelling and chemical quality of medicines. In general, this
would be achieved most efficiently by working with manufac-
turers and importers at the national level, using the leverage
of the registration process. At a local level, providing local
inspectors with up-to-date checklists of registered products
could reduce the prevalence of unregistered antimalarials
on the market, and potentially improve drug quality. It is also
possible that eliminating all prescription-only medicines from
drug stores would limit inappropriate use and reduce drug
pressure and, thereby, the growth of antibiotic and antimalarial
drug resistance.
However, tighter enforcement of some regulations could have
a negative public health impact. Eliminating all prescription-
only medicines from drug stores could restrict the access of
poor rural populations to effective medicines, particularly when
government facilities are out of stock. Hammer has argued that
this would be most damaging for products where enforcing
prescription-only status means that a high proportion of people
will fail to access the drug and the health consequences of
not obtaining the drug are high, but the difference in appro-
priate use with and without a prescription is small, and
the consequences of inappropriate treatment are not severe
(Hammer 1992). He argues that first-line antimalarial treat-
ment provides a good example of a drug meeting these criteria,
implying that it might be appropriate to remove the prescription
requirement for first-line antimalarials and possibly some
antibiotics.
Enforcing the health-related qualification requirement of
4 years’ training for drug store sellers might improve the
knowledge of sellers, but could also raise costs due to the
higher wages needed to attract such sellers, and potentially
put upward pressure on prices. It is anticipated that scaling-up
priority interventions in the areas of HIV, TB and vaccination,
for example, will require a significant increase in Tanzania’s
facility-based human resources over the next 5 to 10 years
(Kurowski et al. 2004). It is therefore unlikely that staff with
appropriate qualifications will be available in sufficient
numbers to fulfil drug store regulations, meaning that many
stores would be forced to close. This would inevitably
drastically reduce drug availability in rural areas.
Enforcing the regulation that only drugs in unit packs be sold
over-the-counter has the potential to guard against tablet
contamination and degradation, and to improve labelling and
dosing instructions, which in turn has been demonstrated to
improve treatment adherence (WHO 2004). However, this could
increase substantially the cost of antimalarials to consumers as,
for example, packaged SP was on average 1.8 times the retail
price of loose SP tablets (Goodman 2004). Although packaged
drugs may be perceived as better quality, such an increase in
price would run the risk of further reducing the proportion of
patients who purchase an adequate antimalarial dose. On the
other hand, enforcement of this regulation might increase
competition between packaged products, eroding the often high
mark-ups on these drugs.
Similar gaps between stated policy and practice on the ground
have been documented throughout the literature on policy
implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). It has been
argued that emphasis on this implementation gap in enforcing
existing regulations derives from a ‘top down’, hierarchical
model of policy implementation (Hill and Hupe 2002). Imple-
mentation can also be seen as a ‘bottom up’ process, where
policy is adapted during implementation, with ‘street level
bureaucrats’ who deliver services or enforce regulations being
key players in this process (Lipsky 1980). Where these front-
line workers have considerable discretion in the execution of
their work, they may even function as ‘de facto bureaucratic
policymakers’ (Meyers and Vorsanger 2002). It has been argued
that such behaviour is not only inevitable but may also be
desirable in promoting local democratic control and tailoring
policies to local needs (Meyers and Vorsanger 2002).
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It could be argued that the gap observed in the Tanzanian
study sites between the official de jure regulations and a locally
legitimate de facto version reflects the success of bottom-up
adaptation of centrally set rules to the realities of drug avail-
ability in remote rural areas. A similar approach to regulatory
infringements has been documented among pharmacy inspec-
tors in Sri Lanka, who took a ‘passive role’ in their dealings
with unlicensed pharmacies in remote areas because they felt
the service had important social benefits (Attanayake and
Siyambalagoda 2003).
However, allowing selective non-compliance of this nature
to continue could signal that compliance is optional, damaging
the credibility of government regulation in general and poten-
tially exerting wide-ranging ill effects in a number of sectors.
One could therefore argue that, instead of clamping down more
harshly, it would be more appropriate to bring the de jure
regulations more in line with their de facto counterparts by,
for example, lowering the official qualifications required for
drug store sellers, and widening the range of legal drug
stocks to include more antimalarials and some oral antibiotics.
This could reduce uncertainty for drug retailers, lead to more
supportive supervisory interactions during visits by district
officials, and provide a more positive environment for public-
private collaboration, including initiatives to encourage appro-
priate use of shop-bought antimalarials and other drugs.
However, it would be unrealistic to assume that the current
state of implementation is necessarily optimal. In tacitly
accepting infringements, inspectors may have failed to consider
other public health consequences of weak regulatory enforce-
ment, such as the impact on antimicrobial resistance. Moreover,
they are unlikely to be motivated purely by the interests of
the community. Failure to implement regulation may also
reflect a desire to reduce their own workload, avoid unpleasant
confrontation and protect their own business interests in the
drug retail sector. The important influence of inspectors on
regulatory implementation points to the need for further quali-
tative research to understand their motivations and incentives,
and the constraints within which they operate.
Legal restrictions are not the only tools for regulating private
providers. In fact, Mackintosh and Tibandebage argue that
‘Effective regulatory intervention is only possible in Tanzania
if the resource constraint on inspection and enforcement can
largely be side-stepped’ (Mackintosh and Tibandebage 2002).
They argue for a move towards ‘collaborative regulation’, where
non-government providers and the general public are seen
as regulatory partners with government. Alternative mecha-
nisms include informal regulation through professional
bodies, the use of provider incentives, and indirect regulation
through consumers (Kumaranayake et al. 2000), considered in
turn below.
Professional associations are common for groups such as
doctors or pharmacists, but rare for retailers such as drug
stores. There are exceptions, such as the Nigerian Association
of Patent and Proprietary Medicine Dealers, founded in 1951,
but no equivalent body currently exists in Tanzania.
Positive incentives to induce appropriate provider behaviour
could be provided via accreditation. This occurs when an
independent agency defines and monitors the standards
of facilities which voluntarily participate in the scheme.
Incentives frequently include provider training, subsidies and
promotion activities (Smith et al. 2001). The approach has been
used for services such as diagnosis and treatment for sexually
transmitted infections and tuberculosis, voluntary counselling
and testing for HIV, and maternal and child health care
packages (Smith et al. 2001). However, successful accreditation
is resource intensive, involving establishing a brand, monitoring
compliance with standards and maintaining quality assurance
systems, and requires an accreditation body with a high level
of capacity (Smith et al. 2001). In low-income countries the
costs of set-up and on-going monitoring have generally been
funded by external agencies, and there is little evidence on
long-term sustainability (Smith et al. 2001).
It could be argued that consumers themselves may be
effective regulators, as they have the greatest incentive to
achieve a high-quality outcome. This could take place through
community organizations or through individual purchasing
power (Bennett et al. 1994). The capacity of consumers to
undertake this role could be enhanced through large-scale,
ongoing communications campaigns, providing information to
enable consumers to judge provider competence, recognize
danger signs, and choose safe and effective medicines (Bloom
and Standing 2001), although the evidence base on these
interventions is currently very limited (Brieger et al. 2004).
However, the limits of this approach should be recognized.
Even following a communications campaign, consumers will
be poor judges of certain aspects of treatment, such as drug
quality. Moreover, their capacity to demand appropriate care
will remain constrained by affordability.
An intervention combining enhanced enforcement, accredita-
tion and consumer information has been piloted in the Ruvuma
Region of Tanzania since 2003, through the establishment of
Accredited Drugs Dispensing Outlets (ADDOs). Part II drug
stores can become ADDOs if they meet specified quality criteria,
including a training programme of 26 days for sellers and
6 days for owners (Sigonda-Ndomondo et al. 2004). The shops
are then allowed to sell a limited range of prescription-only
essential medicines, and receive additional support through
regular supervision, refresher training, marketing of the ADDO
brand, and commercial incentives such as business skills
training and access to microfinance. Some regulatory respon-
sibilities have been transferred from district to ward-level
officials, who it is hoped will be more aware of the shops’
day-to-day operation. Improvements in services have been
documented in the pilot areas with, for example, reductions
in the number of unregistered medicines on sale and the
frequency of inappropriate sales of antibiotics (Mbwasi 2005).
The government plans to scale up this initiative and eventually
eliminate all non-accredited Part II stores, replacing them
with ADDOs.
However, the ADDO programme has substantial financial
and managerial capacity requirements, and the feasibility of
implementing the piloted intervention nationwide in Tanzania’s
6000-plus Part II stores is open to debate. There is evidence that
the Ministry of Health currently struggles to provide appro-
priate supervision and commodity supplies to its own primary
care facilities (National Malaria Control Programme 2002); such
an ambitious drug store programme could distract attention
from the government’s core responsibility of ensuring good
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facility care. There is therefore a need for evaluation of a range
of strategies, with a focus on the potential to scale them up and
sustain them in the face of existing capacity constraints.
Conclusions
Drug stores in rural Tanzania frequently infringe pharmaceu-
tical regulations. It is the norm to find that shops lack valid
permits, their staff do not meet the qualification requirements,
and they stock prescription-only medicines, unregistered
products and unpackaged tablets. Infringements are likely to
reflect a combination of relatively infrequent regulatory inspec-
tions, a failure to implement heavy sanctions, successful
concealment of regulatory violations, and the tacit permission
of local regulatory staff. However, drug stores are important
treatment providers for fever/malaria, providing a potentially
life-saving source of medicines in many remote areas.
The challenge is to define the mix of interventions that build
on this important role, while safeguarding public health.
To date, most attention has focused on the use of legal controls
to restrict the availability of medicines to outlets with suitably
qualified staff, although implementation is clearly highly
inadequate. Successfully eliminating regulatory infringements
is likely to be infeasible, due to the incentives faced by drug
store staff and inspectors, and the capacity constraints of the
latter.
Moreover, we should be alert to situations where increased
regulatory enforcement could actually do more harm than good,
by restricting access to much-needed medicines. Drug regula-
tion should address societal objectives, meaning that it should
serve to protect and promote public health. These goals may
be best served by revising official drug regulation to bring it
closer into line with current locally legitimate implementation.
Moreover, change in drug store operation may be more effecti-
vely achieved through positive incentives and/or consumer
involvement, with the proviso that unreasonable demands on
implementation capacity be avoided. Such a change in approach
has the potential to provide a firmer platform for public-private
collaboration to improve shop-based treatment of malaria and
other priority health problems.
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